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Abstract 
We lose waking consciousness spontaneously and regularly over the circadian cycle. It seems that 
every time we fall asleep, reflective thinking gradually gives way to our interactions with an 
imaginary, hallucinatory world that brings multimodal experiences in the absence of adequate 
external stimuli. The present study investigates this transition, proposing a new measure of 
hallucinatory states. Reflective thinking and motor imagery were quantified in 150 mentation 
reports provided by 16 participants after forced awakenings from different physiology-
monitored time intervals after sleep onset. Cognitive agency analysis and motor agency analysis 
– which are objective (grammatical–semantic) tools derived from linguistic theories – show (i) a
decrease in reflective thinking which sleepers would need to acknowledge the hallucinatory 
quality of their state, and (ii) an increase in motor imagery, indicating interactions with a 
hallucinatory world. By mapping these spontaneous changes in human consciousness onto 
physiology, we can in the long run explore the conditions of its decline, and possibilities for 
treatment. 
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Introduction 
The transition from quiet waking to sleeping involves a variety of physiological changes. These 
changes involve chemical neuromodulation based on the interaction of aminergic and cholinergic 
systems, resulting in the hypoactivation of frontal regions, including the dorsolateral prefrontal 
and orbitofrontal cortex (Fosse et al., 2001 and Hobson et al., 2000). Cerebral areas are known to 
fall asleep at different times. It has for example been shown that the left hemisphere has a shorter 
sleep onset latency than the right (Casagrande and Bertini, 2008, Casagrande et al., 1996 and 
© <2016>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
Casagrande et al., 1995). On the level of behaviour, we can see a decrease in performance over 
the course of time with regard to reacting to external stimuli or carrying out repetitive motor 
tasks, such as finger tapping (Casagrande et al., 1997, Casagrande et al., 1996 and Violani et al., 
1998). 
This study investigates the accompanying psychological and cognitive changes, 
specifically the transition from reflective thinking towards hallucination: earlier studies suggest 
that “normal, wake-like thoughts” decrease from waking to sleep onset, to non-REM, and finally 
REM sleep (Fosse et al., 2001 and Speth and Speth, 2016), to be replaced by “unusual thoughts” 
and hallucinations as multimodal perceptions occurring in the absence of adequate external 
stimuli (Rowley et al., 1998 and Silbersweig et al., 1995). To complement previous content-based 
ratings, the present study proposes a new, quantitative measure of hallucinatory states: 
mentation reports from sleep onset, the physiological markers of which were determined by the 
nightcap sleep monitoring device (Ajilore et al., 1995, Cantero et al., 2002 and Stickgold et al., 
2001), are linguistically quantified via cognitive agency analysis and motor agency analysis. 
We hypothesize that mentation reports collected from later in sleep onset will exhibit a 
decline in reflective thinking. We further hypothesize that motor imagery, as a positive symptom 
of hallucinations, will increase over the course of sleep onset: motor imagery can be seen as an 
indicator of interactions with an imaginative, or hallucinatory, world, or of the (mental) 
navigation through this world. It has previously been shown that motor imagery differs 
systematically across sleep states – whereby REM sleep shows highest levels of motor imagery, 
followed by non-REM sleep, while sleep onset exhibits the lowest levels of motor imagery (Speth 
et al., 2013 and Speth and Speth, 2016). The present analysis should thus reflect an increase in 
motor imagery as participants transition from sleep onset to non-REM sleep. Mentation reports 
collected from later as opposed to earlier in sleep onset should contain more references to motor 
imagery. We will further (a) learn if quantitative linguistic analysis is a feasible tool to investigate 
mentation during a transitional state of consciousness, and (b) observe the shape of the function 
of the decline in cognitive agency versus the ascent of motor agency. 
The results could pave the way for an improved understanding of the mechanisms of the 
human capacity for reflective thinking, and the physiological conditions of its decline: the present 
tool can allow for greater qualitative and quantitative accuracy in mapping the psychological 
markers of hallucinatory states onto physiological changes – as opposed to merely dichotomous 
ratings of individuals’ mentation during specific states of consciousness as “lucid” versus 
“hallucinatory” by third person raters. The present measure further brings higher objectivity, 
reliability, and validity in comparison to investigations that rely solely on the (probably differing) 
self-evaluations of participants who may exhibit individual interpretations of the abstract, latent 
variables that are to be tested here (see Speth et al., 2013 and Speth et al., 2015 on the greater 
qualitative and quantitative accuracy of linguistic tools in quantitative mentation report analysis, 
and Windt, 2013 as well as Speth, Harley, & Speth, in press, on the crucial distinction between 
third person ratings of mentation reports versus participants’ opinions of their own mental 
events as obtained via questionnaires). The present measure can potentially be used to reveal the 
distinct patterns of connected changes in (i) reflective thinking, and (ii) motor imagery, as 
functions of (iii) physiological changes such as described above. 
An improved knowledge of the changes in mentation that occur en route to hallucinatory 
states could in the long run be beneficial for improved clinical diagnoses and therapy. First, 
prominent changes in mentation could draw our attention to the connection between distinct 
physiological changes and specific markers of human mentation, as well as their pathological 
alterations. An understanding of the distinct interplay of (pathological) physiological changes and 
human mentation may bring progress in two groups of therapeutic treatment: It may allow (i) for 
better pharmacological treatment or refined protocols for electrical brain stimulation to target 
changes in physiology. It may also allow for (ii) improved treatment plans in cognitive-
behavioural therapy that target changes in mentation. A third area of application may be (iii) the 
combination of treatments targeting changes in physiology as well as changes in mentation, for 
example in the context of the increasingly popular bio- or neurofeedback systems where acoustic 
or visual signals of changes in physiology can be used as positive or negative reinforcements of 
users’ mental strategies. Especially spontaneous motor imagery has been shown to lend itself to 
such manipulation (Speth et al., 2015), and the current measure for hallucinatory states may in 
the future reveal new opportunities for treatment. 
Method 
Linguistic analysis was conducted on a database of mentation reports from sleep onset. 
References to reflective thinking and motor imagery were rated blindly. Analysis was conducted 
with pre-validated tools derived from established grammatical and semantic theories. 
Database 
The database comprised 150 reports obtained from sixteen university students (8 male, 8 
female). Participants were 19–26 years of age, had provided informed consent, and received 
financial compensation for participating in the study. Participants were required to complete a 
preliminary training protocol before asked to deliver oral mentation reports over a fourteen day 
period. The reports were conceived with a dictation device after instrumental awakenings by a 
noise signal. Awakenings were initiated by the Nightcap, a sleep-stage detection device that has 
been shown to reliably detect sleep onset based on changes in eyelid movement patterns 
(detailed information on the Nightcap database can be found in Stickgold et al., 2001). Reports 
could thus be collected from quiet waking, as well as 15, 45, 75, 120, or 300 s after sleep onset. 
The transcribed oral reports were edited according to the technique of Antrobus (1983), which 
involved removing participants’ additional commentary on their mentation. 
 
Linguistic analysis of motor imagery 
Linguistic indications of motor imagery were quantified by means of motor agency analysis 
(Speth et al., 2013 and Speth et al., 2015), a grammatical tool based on linguistic theta theory 
(Gruber, 2001, Reinhart, 2002 and Reinhart and Siloni, 2005). References to motor imagery were 
quantified as grammatical (theta role) agencies that denote manner-of-motion verbs. The tool has 
been pre-validated by linking the number of linguistic references to motor imagery with patterns 
of motor cortical activation of REM sleep versus sleep onset hypnagogia, as well as under tDC 
stimulation. The tool has been shown to be reliable (Speth et al., 2013 and Speth et al., 2015). 
In theta theory, the grammatical agent is a noun phrase that stands in a specific 
relationship to a verb phrase, performing the action described by the predicate. Note that the 
grammatical agent is often but not necessarily congruent with the syntactic subject. In motor 
agency analysis, only those agencies that describe (simulated) motor movement are counted. 
Further, to account for the fact that the English language comprises many movement 
metaphors and idioms, the intensity of the motor imagery was determined by classifying motor 
agencies as athletic versus non-athletic according to the list of Olympic and World Games 
disciplines (compare http://www.olympic.org/sports, https://www.theworldgames.org/the-
sports/sports). The phrase “Mimi walked to Rome” would thus be classified as denoting more 
intense motor imagery than the phrase “Mimi went to Rome”. 
 
Linguistic analysis of cognitive agency 
Linguistic indications of reflective thinking were quantified by means of cognitive agency 
analysis. Cognitive agency analysis is a tool that is likewise based on linguistic theta theory, but 
quantifies grammatical agencies related to the semantic field of cognitive acts (for detailed 
information, please see Speth and Speth, 2015a, Speth and Speth, 2015b and Speth and Speth, 
2016, and Speth, Speth, et al., in press). 
 
Statistical analyses 
The numbers of motor agencies, athletic motor agencies, and cognitive agencies per report were 
compared across the different times after quiet waking and sleep onset by means of a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Fishers’ least significant difference (LSD) testing was conducted 
post hoc. A Pearson product-moment correlation was used to assert an association between time 
after sleep onset and the number of motor agencies, athletic motor agencies, and cognitive 
agencies. To show the relation between the different kinds of agencies, the difference between 
motor agencies, athletic motor agencies, and cognitive agencies was calculated for each report. 
An ANOVA was conducted to test for changes in these difference values. To allow for better 
comparability with earlier findings, the percentages of reports containing one instance or more 
of motor agency, athletic motor agency, or cognitive agency are also reported for each interval. 
As the length of the mentation report is an important dependent variable in many dream studies, 
and is for example dependent on the time of night (Casagrande, Violani, Lucidi, Buttinelli, & 
Bertini, 1996) and/or the modality of reporting (Casagrande and Cortini, 2008 and Casagrande 
et al., 1996), the mean report length (word count) was also calculated. An analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) with word count as covariate was conducted for motor agency and cognitive agency. 
Fisher’s LSD testing was used post hoc. 
Results 
Of the 150 reports, 35 were collected when the participant was still awake, and 27 reports were 
collected from 15 s, 20 from 45 s, 26 from 75 s, 18 from 120 s, and 24 from 300 s after sleep onset. 
The mean number of words per report per time of awakening was as follows. Still awake: 
56.9 (SD = 27.3); 15 s: 44.4 (SD = 20.8); 45 s: 44.1 (SD = 18.8); 75 s: 49.2 (SD = 22.4); 120 s: 36.3 
(SD = 17), 300 s: 35.8 (SD = 18.3). This difference was statistically significant (F (5, 144) = 3.72, p 
= .003; η2 = .114): Reports from waking tended to be longer than reports collected at 15 s (p = 
.026), 45 s (p = .037), 120 s (p = .001), and 300 s after sleep onset (p > .001), and reports collected 
75 s after sleep onset were longer than reports collected 300 s after sleep onset (p = .031). 
In total, 70.7% of all reports exhibited one instance or more of cognitive agency, 15.3% 
exhibited one instance or more of motor agency, and 4% exhibited one instance or more of 
athletic motor agency. Please see Table 1 for linguistic samples, and see Figure 1 for the changes 
in percentages over time. 
 
Table 1: Linguistic samples from mentation reports from 15 s, 45 s, 75 s, 120 s, and 300 s, after sleep onset. The type of 
agency (cognitive agency, motor agency, athletic motor agency) and the grammatical perspective (first, second, third) 
from which the agency is reported are given. 
 Linguistic sample 
Agency type (cognitive, motor, 
motor-athletic) and 
grammatical perspective 
15 s after 
sleep onset 
 
I was thinking about E. V. who's a friend of mine 
from Exeter and I was thinking about how we were 
supposed to get drunk -- not get drunk but like have 
a drink together and talk about shit.  And I was 
thinking about like the two of us back in high school 
and 
stuff, how we interacted and everything in like a 
rock band that was in.  He used to play guitar and 
stuff.  I was thinking about the rock band, The 
Atomic Chia Pets. 
 
I was just thinking about laundry and putting two 
colors together that don't go together and the 
ironing, And something to do with the poetry room 
too, about ironing something for that. 
 
 











1 x first person cognitive agency 
45 s after 
sleep onset 
I cannot believe the number of times that I have to 
wake up and do tape.  And I was sort of having that 
thought and having that thought evolve 
 
In my mind I was bouncing this rubber ball that a 
friend of mine gave me so actually I can feel it and I 
guess I thought I sort of was bouncing it 
 




2 x first person motor agency, 
athletic  
75 s after 
sleep onset 
I think I was sort of baking up a grand plan in my 
head for how I was going to get in shape for the 
next couple days; been trying to do this running 
regimen between three and four. But it hasn't been 
working too well because of the Meso paper and 
stuff.  And I was just 
thinking how I really want get in shape for the 
Senior Soiree and things like that. 
 
2 x first person cognitive agency 
120 s after 
sleep onset 
I was thinking about the rules of naming and where 
all the names come from and right before that I was 
straightening my Nightcap, making sure everything 
is all where it's supposed to be.  And I just want to 
go to sleep and I was wondering when this onset 
part 
ends. I was thinking it takes an hour. Then it keeps 
waking you up 
 
Playing tennis.  And it was sunny and warm and we 
were in Florida `cause I think we were … golf 
course; courses and my Dad was there 
 









1 x first person motor agency, 
athletic 
300 s after 
sleep onset 
I was half dreaming and half thinking about just 
hanging out with a bunch of people and we were 
just sitting around talking.  I think I was talking 
about different places I'd visited.  I was thinking 
about different like places to hang out with friends 
 
I'm in my house in Delaware and there's people 
starting to come in.  It's a party and it's 
getting crowded, we're getting dressed up for the 
formal but the guys weren't wearing tuxedos.   
 
I was wandering on some kind of hill that was near 
a port and two minutes or so before I saw like a 
white light.  It was weird; but no light this time.  
Grocery shopping I think was in there too from this 
time 
 






1 x third person plural motor 
agency 
1 x first person plural motor 
agency 
 
1 x first person singular motor 
agency 




Figure 1: Percentages of reports with one instance or more of cognitive agency, motor agency, or athletic motor agency 
before sleep onset, and conceived 15, 45, 75, 120, and 300 s after sleep onset. Note that athletic motor agency is a 
subcategory of motor agency. 
The number of cognitive agencies (F (5, 144) = 3.14, p = .01; η2 = .098) and motor agencies 
(F (5, 144) = 2.9, p = .016, η2 = .092) differed over time. There were fewer instances of cognitive 
agency at 75 s (M = 1.1, SD = 1.01; p = .01), 120 s (M = 0.74, SD = 0.89; p = .001), and 300 s (M = 
0.97, SD = 1.07; p = .004) after transition to sleep in comparison to when participants were still 
awake (M = 1.8, SD = 1.5). In contrast, there were more instances of motor agency at 45 s (M = 
0.35, SD = 0.59; p = .007), 75 s (M = 0.31, SD = 0.62; p = .01), and 300 s (M = 0.33, SD = 0.64; p = 
.006) after the transition to sleep in comparison to wakefulness (M = 0, SD = 0). The number of 
athletic motor agencies did not differ over time. See Figure 2. 
:
 
Figure 2: Mean number of instances of cognitive agency, motor agency, and athletic motor agency in reports from waking, 
and conceived 15, 45, 75, 120, and 300 s after sleep onset. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. Note that 
athletic motor agency is a subcategory of motor agency. 
When the number of words per report was used as a covariate of cognitive agency, the 
effect of time on cognitive agency was not significant (F (5, 143) = 1.39, p = .23). Motor agency 
however, when corrected for report length, differed significantly over time (F (5, 143) = 2.953 p 
= .014, partial η2 = .094). There were fewer motor agencies in reports from quiet wake compared 
to reports collected at 45 s (p = .006), 75 s (p = .009), and 300 s after sleep onset (p = .006). 
A Pearson product-moment correlation revealed a negative relationship between the 
time progressing after sleep onset and cognitive agency: the longer the time period after sleep 
onset, the fewer cognitive agencies were observed in the mentation reports. There was further a 
positive relationship between motor agency and athletic motor agency. See Table 2. 
 
 Figure 3: Pearson correlation coefficients between (1) time after sleep onset, (2) cognitive agency, (3) motor agency, and 
(4) athletic motor agency. 
In a second step of analysis, the differences between the number of cognitive agencies and 
motor agencies were calculated for each report. The difference between cognitive agency and 
motor agency decreased over time (F (5, 144) = 4.41, p = .001; η2 = .133). See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4: Difference in the number of cognitive and motor agencies per report from waking, and conceived 15, 45, 75, 120, 
and 300 s after sleep onset. 
Discussion 
This study set out to investigate the transition from reflective thinking to hallucinatory 
experiences, which is hypothesized to occur at sleep onset along with a series of physiological 
changes, including the hypoactivation of the dorsolateral and the orbitofrontal cortex (Fosse et 
al., 2001). Mentation reports from quiet waking as well as reports collected at 15, 45, 75, 120, or 
300 s after sleep onset were analysed blindly by means of cognitive agency analysis and motor 
agency analysis – quantitative linguistic tools which could recently show that reflective thinking 
decreases across states of consciousness, from quiet waking to sleep onset, to non-REM, and 
finally REM sleep ( Speth & Speth, 2016), and that sleep onset involves less motor imagery than 
REM sleep (Speth et al., 2013). The present results suggest that mentation reports collected from 
later in sleep onset exhibit a decline in references to reflective thinking, with the number of 
cognitive agencies reduced by half at circa 120 s after sleep onset, despite the fact that these 
reports cover a larger mentation span. At the same time, motor imagery as a positive symptom of 
hallucination (indicating the interaction with an imaginative world in the absence of adequate 
external stimuli) increases during sleep onset. In so far as (i) quantitative differences in linguistic 
cognitive agency and motor agency in the mentation reports refer to changes in reflective 
thinking and motor imagery, it seems that (ii) these are independent, meaningful factors that 
mark significant changes in cognition within the short period of sleep onset, wherein (iii) 
reflective thinking appears to decline rapidly and steadily, while motor imagery increases. 
For motor agency, these results are robust to the correction for report length, while they 
are not so for cognitive agency. A reason for this could be that the correction for report length is 
not always adequate for the empirical analysis of mentation reports: as mentation content and 
mentation report length are not independent of each other, a correction for report length can lead 
to the exclusion of meaningful elements from our analysis (Hobson et al., 2000, Speth et al., in 
press and Speth and Speth, 2016). 
The present study provides a first proof of principle that it is feasible to quantify the level 
of reflective thinking and motor imagery in mentation reports from different times of sleep onset 
to observe the transition towards a hallucinatory state. The tool in the present study could thus 
be used for future investigations of sleep onset: as a discrepancy between physiological indicators 
of sleep onset and the subjective feeling of falling asleep is known to occur in healthy participants 
(Casagrande et al., 1997) as well as in participants diagnosed with sleep disorders (Moon, Song, 
& Cho, 2015), a further study could show how this sensation corresponds not only with 
physiological variables, but also with levels of cognitive agency and motor agency in mentation 
reports. Future investigations could also combine motor tasks (such as finger tapping by which 
participants signal that they are still awake; see Casagrande et al., 1997), physiological 
measurements, and motor agency analysis, for a closer investigation of the relations between 
physiology, behaviour, and subjective experience in sleep onset. 
These insights could in the long run help us to better understand and treat the 
physiological and psychological causes around a loss of reflective thinking as it occurs in 
connection with acute hallucinatory episodes in different psychopathologies such as 
schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and dementia: an improved knowledge of the 
changes in mentation en route to hallucinatory states could in the long run thus help both basic 
science and applied clinical research. 
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